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O P I N I O N 
_________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
Facing federal child pornography charges, defendant-
appellee Robert Caesar moved to suppress evidence seized 
pursuant to search warrants executed by the Pennsylvania State 
Police.  The District Court granted the motion in part, 
suppressing thousands of images of child pornography and 
photographs of Caesar’s sexual abuse victims.  The 
Government now appeals. 
The initial warrant application contained information 
that Caesar had sexually abused two children in his home and, 
on multiple occasions, took to the Internet seeking out used 
children’s undergarments and photos and videos of partially 
clothed children.  Although the supporting affidavit included 
no express allegations that Caesar possessed child 
pornography, it stated that child abusers “routinely keep” such 
images.  App. 49.  The magistrate judge issued a warrant 
authorizing officers to search Caesar’s home for child 
pornography and other sexually explicit images of minors, 
among other things, and several items of electronic equipment, 
later found to contain child pornography, were seized.  
Charged under federal law with producing, receiving, and 
possessing child pornography, Caesar moved to suppress the 
images.  The District Court excluded the images, determining 




pornography failed to establish probable cause.  It further 
concluded that the affidavit was so deficient that the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.  Because we 
conclude that the officers relied on the initial warrant in good 
faith, we will reverse that part of the District Court order 
suppressing the images and remand for further proceedings. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The evidence at issue was gathered by State Police 
officers pursuant to three search warrants while investigating 
Caesar for various sexual offenses involving minors.  Because 
our Fourth Amendment inquiry turns on the sufficiency of the 
affidavits of probable cause presented to the issuing magistrate, 
the facts are largely drawn from those affidavits.  See United 
States v. Zimmerman, 277 F.3d 426, 430 n.3 (3d Cir. 2002). 
A. The Initial Tip and Caesar’s eBay Activity 
In July 2017, the State Police received a tip from the 
National Center for Missing and Exploited Children 
(“NCMEC”) about suspicious online activity by an eBay user.  
Officers investigated the tip and discovered several outgoing 
messages from the user’s account, horses357, seeking to buy 
children’s used underwear and swimsuits.  In one message, the 
user asked for a photo of the inside of the clothing item and for 
information about the age and weight of the child who 
previously wore it.  In another message, the user, posing as a 
parent buying swimwear for his son, asked, “who wore this and 
at what age?”  App. 49.  In a third message, the user posed as 
a child looking for photos or videos of other children in their 
undergarments:   
Hi, [i]t’s JJ again.  I won these, yeah!  But I spent 
more than dad said I could.  He might not be to 
[sic] happy.  Can your son David do another 
video in these or the white ones before you send 
them?  Or some pics please?  I didn’t win the 
black and blue ones my brother wanted.  
Someone out bid [sic] me . . . after the sale was 
over.  Can you ask your son if he would like to 
exchange email addresses please? . . . Ok, thanks 






The State Police learned that horses357 was registered 
to “Robert Caesar . . . of 906 Street Rd., Oxford, PA.”  App. 
49.  Several other pieces of information corroborated Caesar’s 
connection to the eBay account.  The account listed Caesar’s 
work email address and phone number, and the Internet 
Protocol (“IP”) address associated with the account was tied to 
a home address in Oxford.  Driver’s license records also 
showed that Caesar’s home address was 906 Street Road.  State 
Police Trooper Stefano Gallina interviewed the owner of the 
residence, who stated that Caesar had rented the house for four 
years.  The landlord also told Gallina that Caesar had never 
been married and had no children.   
B. Subsequent Investigation into Sexual Abuse 
of the Two Brothers 
While the initial investigation was ongoing, in January 
2018 Gallina received a referral from Children and Youth 
Services alleging that Caesar had sexually abused two 
adolescent brothers.  On January 17, 2018, Gallina interviewed 
the brothers—ages sixteen and fourteen—and their mother, 
separately.  The older brother told Gallina that, a few years 
prior, Caesar began paying the boys to do occasional chores 
around his house.  “[S]ome time” later, Caesar started 
supplying him (then fourteen years old) and his brother (then 
twelve years old) with alcohol.  App. 50.  Around June 2015, 
Caesar began sexually abusing the boys.  Caesar would provide 
the older brother alcohol and then take him to Caesar’s 
bedroom, where Caesar performed oral sex on him and forced 
the boy to masturbate him.  The sexual abuse took place 
“several times” and “always” occurred in Caesar’s bed.  App. 
50.  On multiple occasions, Caesar asked the older brother to 
engage in other sexual acts with him, but the boy refused.  The 
boy agreed, however, to let Caesar keep a few articles of his 
underwear.   
The younger brother advanced similar allegations in his 
interview with Gallina.  He also stated that Caesar supplied him 
with alcohol and brought him to the bedroom, where Caesar 




conduct continued until late December 2017, at which point 
their parents prohibited them from returning to Caesar’s house.  
In her interview with Gallina, the boys’ mother stated only that 
the younger brother returned home from Caesar’s house one 
evening in late December 2017 smelling like alcohol.  She did 
not share any information about the alleged sexual abuse.   
The day after these interviews, Gallina applied for two 
warrants to search for evidence of aggravated indecent assault 
of a minor, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3125(a)(8).  The 
warrant applications sought authority for the following: 
• In the first warrant, a search of Caesar’s home for 
two categories of evidence: (1) physical evidence of 
the alleged sexual abuse, consisting of “[s]emen and 
bodily fluid belonging to the victims, children’s 
underwear and swimwear,” and (2) “images of child 
pornography, child erotica or nudity and/or any 
images of the victims in any form (hard copy 
photographs, VHS tapes, DVD’s, CD’s, or stored on 
personal electronic devices).”  App. 47.  This second 
category of evidence is at issue on appeal. 
• In the second warrant, a collection of a sample of 
Caesar’s DNA.   
The affidavits of probable cause supporting the first and second 
warrants each consisted of four single-spaced pages that set 
forth a detailed description of Caesar’s eBay messages and the 
sexual abuse allegations against him. 
In addition, the affidavits provided an extensive 
accounting of Gallina’s experience and training as a State 
Police trooper and ex-Federal Air Marshal.  At the time of the 
investigation, Gallina had been a trooper for approximately six 
years and “ha[d] investigated several thousand criminal 
incidents.”  App. 48.  Many of these criminal investigations 
“included the search and investigation of electronic 
communication devices, electronic records and data.”  App. 48.  
He had also taken courses on general investigation techniques, 
investigation methods for drug crimes and violent crimes, and 
criminal behavior assessment, among other subjects.  None of 




Based on his training and experience, Gallina made 
several statements about the tendency of child abusers to 
possess child pornography and other sexually explicit images.  
He alleged that he  
kn[ew] that those involved in the sexual abuse of 
children and juveniles routinely keep and 
maintain . . . [digital or physical copies of] 
photographs of nude children and of children 
posed in various states of undress . . .  [and] 
videos of nude children and of children posed in 
various states of undress performing sexual acts 
. . . . 
App. 49.  At other points in the affidavit, Gallina repeated 
similar allegations that child abusers “routinely and commonly 
store, share, and maintain” sexually explicit images and videos 
of children.  App. 51.  He also averred that individuals who 
sexually abuse children often browse the internet for child 
pornography and used articles of children’s clothing on 
websites such as Craigslist, eBay, and Facebook Marketplace.   
A Chester County magistrate judge issued the two 
warrants and the State Police searched Caesar’s home the same 
day.  During the search, officers seized stained bedsheets, 
pillowcases, and articles of stained children’s underwear.  
They also discovered several pieces of electronic equipment, 
including a cell phone, digital camera, various VHS cassettes 
and compact discs, two computers, and multiple external hard 
drives.  One of the hard drives was found wedged between the 
mattress and box spring in Caesar’s bedroom.  The officers did 
not search the devices immediately upon seizing them.   
Later that day, following the search, Gallina arrested 
Caesar and brought him to the police station for questioning.  
After Gallina read Caesar his Miranda1 rights, Caesar agreed 
to be interviewed.  The interview proceeded for about an hour 
until Caesar told Gallina that he did not want to answer more 
questions.  Notwithstanding Caesar’s multiple invocations of 
his right to remain silent, Gallina continued to question him.  
Caesar went on to admit that he sexually abused the two 
 




brothers, used the underwear and swimsuits that he bought on 
eBay as a means for sexual gratification, and viewed child 
pornography on some of the seized devices.  Before the District 
Court, the Government conceded that all these post-invocation 
admissions should be suppressed.  The parties do not contest 
this issue on appeal. 
Although the initial warrant permitted a search for 
images “in any form . . . [including those] stored on personal 
electronic devices,” App. 47, Gallina later secured an 
additional warrant specifically authorizing a search of the 
seized devices’ contents.  At oral argument, counsel for the 
Government noted that law enforcement officers often seek an 
additional standalone warrant to search computer devices as a 
“belt-and-suspenders” approach to conducting investigations.  
Oral Arg. at 12:20–13:45.  The third warrant application 
included nearly all the information in the first affidavit, in 
addition to a summary of the items seized in the search of 
Caesar’s residence and Caesar’s post-invocation admissions 
from his interrogation.  Equipped with both the initial warrant 
and third warrant, the State Police found over 70,000 images 
and videos of child pornography on the seized devices.  These 
images included several sexually explicit photos of the 
younger brother.   
C. Caesar’s Criminal Proceedings and 
Suppression Motion 
Caesar was indicted in federal court and charged with 
production of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) 
and (e), receipt of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(2), and possession of child pornography under 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).2  He then moved to suppress all the 
 
2 In addition, the Chester County district attorney charged 
Caesar with various state child sexual assault and child 
pornography offenses.  While the district attorney’s office 
dropped the state child pornography charges in favor of the 
federal prosecution, it pursued the sexual assault charges 
involving the two brothers, and a jury convicted Caesar in 
August 2020.  In that case, the Chester County Court of 





evidence seized in the search of his home.  The District Court 
denied the motion as to the DNA sample and physical evidence 
of sexual abuse but granted it with respect to the “images of 
child pornography, child erotica or nudity and any images of 
the victims” 3 discovered on the electronic devices.  United 
States v. Caesar, No. 18-525, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, 
at *26 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2019).  This timely appeal followed.  
If affirmed, the District Court’s suppression order would 
effectively terminate Caesar’s federal prosecution, which 
involves only the child pornography charges.   
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731.  In reviewing the District Court’s 
suppression order, we review its factual findings for clear error 
and exercise de novo review over its legal conclusions.  See 
United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2018). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Fourth Amendment forbids “unreasonable searches 
and seizures” and mandates that “no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause.”  U.S. Const. amend. IV.  The violation 
of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights, however, does 
not always guarantee suppression of evidence derived from an 
illegal search.  See United States v. Katzin, 769 F.3d 163, 170 
(3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  That is because “the exclusionary 
rule is not an individual right,” but a prudential remedy meant 
to deter law enforcement officials from engaging in 
unreasonable searches and seizures.  Herring v. United 
States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465, 482 (1976) (describing the exclusionary rule as “a 
 
statements, but not any physical evidence obtained in the 
searches.   
3 Although courts have distinguished child pornography and 
“child erotica,” for convenience we will refer to the “images of 
child pornography, child erotica or nudity” identified in the 
first and third warrants collectively as “child pornography.”  





judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by 
the Fourth Amendment”); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 
206, 217 (1960) (“The [exclusionary] rule is calculated to 
prevent, not to repair.”). 
Because the suppression remedy is an “extreme 
sanction” that carries significant costs, United States v. Leon, 
468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984), however, it “has always been our 
last resort, not our first impulse,” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 
U.S. 586, 591 (2006).  Given these costs, the Supreme Court in 
Leon established the “good faith” exception to the exclusionary 
rule, which prohibits suppression of “evidence obtained in 
objectively reasonable reliance” on a warrant later invalidated 
for lack of probable cause.  468 U.S. at 922.  
A. The District Court Opinion 
The District Court concluded that the officers lacked 
probable cause to search for the images and that the good faith 
exception did not apply.  In so holding, the District Court 
primarily relied on our opinion in United States v. Zimmerman, 
a Fourth Amendment case that, as here, involved a warrant 
application that alleged the supposed tendency of child 
molesters to possess child pornography.  The District Court 
determined that, under Zimmerman, Gallina’s statements about 
the molestation-pornography link were merely “boilerplate” 
and that, without more factual support, these statements failed 
to establish probable cause to search for evidence of child 
pornography.  Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *18, 
20.  Despite the detailed averments about Caesar’s eBay 
messages and prolonged sexual abuse of the brothers, the 
District Court held that the first affidavit “lacked any facts 
tying Caesar’s home to child pornography or to images of the 
victims.”  Id. at *18.  Absent such facts, the court reasoned, the 
affidavit failed to state probable cause to search for the images.  
Citing Zimmerman and our opinion in Virgin Islands v. John, 
654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), the District Court further held that 
the weaknesses of the first affidavit were so glaring that it was 
“entirely unreasonable” and, “at a minimum, grossly 
negligent” for Gallina to rely on the constitutionally infirm 
warrant.  Id. at *20.  Thus, the good faith exception to the 




The District Court concluded that the third warrant also 
did not render the images admissible.  Although the third 
warrant provided additional authorization to search the 
electronic devices—separate from the initial warrant—the 
District Court held that the images were nonetheless tainted by 
the unlawful search of Caesar’s house because Gallina 
leveraged the fruits of that search to elicit Caesar’s confession 
during the interrogation.4  Pointing to what it considered to be 
Gallina’s “grossly negligent” reliance on the first warrant and 
his willful violation of Caesar’s right to remain silent during 
the later interrogation, the District Court also held that Gallina 
did not rely on the third warrant in good faith.  Id. at *22 n.6, 
23 n.8.  The court therefore concluded that the images should 
be suppressed. 
On appeal, the Government urges that the District Court 
erred in two ways.  First, it argues that the searches of Caesar’s 
home and electronic devices were supported by probable cause 
and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures.  Second, it argues that in any event, the State Police 
reasonably relied on the magistrate judge’s probable cause 
determinations such that the good faith exception should 
 
4 The District Court declined to decide whether Gallina’s 
violation of Caesar’s right to remain silent alone required 
suppression of the images.  As the District Court noted, the 
“fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine does not apply to 
nontestimonial, physical evidence derived from a suspect’s 
voluntary statements made before officers inform him of his 
Miranda rights.  See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 
636 (2004) (“The Self-Incrimination Clause . . . is not 
implicated by the admission into evidence of the physical fruit 
of a voluntary statement.”); United States v. DeSumma, 272 
F.3d 176, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2001).  But we have not opined 
whether that same principle applies to physical evidence 
derived from a suspect’s statements elicited in violation of 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), where the suspect 
invokes his right to an attorney or right to remain silent, yet 





apply.5   
We need only address the Government’s second 
argument to resolve this appeal.  Because we conclude that the 
good faith exception applies, we need not determine whether 
probable cause supported the searches in the first place.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred 
Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents, 307 F.3d 137, 145 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“turn[ing] ‘immediately to a consideration of 
the officers’ good faith’” rather than first analyzing probable 
cause (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 925)); see also Katzin, 769 
F.3d at 170.   
B. The Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith 
Exception 
As required by Leon and its progeny, we apply the 
exclusionary rule only in those “unusual cases” where it may 
achieve its “remedial objectives”: to appreciably deter 
unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement 
officers.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 908, 918.  The rule is designed to 
eliminate any incentive for officers to violate suspects’ Fourth 
Amendment rights by prohibiting the admission of illegally 
seized evidence at trial.  Herring, 555 U.S. at 139–40.  By 
doing so, suppression “compel[s] respect for the [Fourth 
Amendment’s] constitutional guaranty in the only effectively 
available way.”  Elkins, 364 U.S. at 217. 
In determining whether to suppress the fruits of an 
unconstitutional search, we must undertake a “rigorous” cost-
benefit analysis, weighing the “deterrence benefits of 
exclusion” against its “substantial social costs.”  Davis v. 
United States, 564 U.S. 229, 237–38 (2011); accord Herring, 
555 U.S. at 141.  Those costs include interfering with courts’ 
truth-seeking function, and more specifically, concealing 
“reliable, trustworthy evidence bearing on guilt or innocence” 
and, in some instances, “set[ting] the criminal loose in the 
community without punishment.”  Davis, 564 U.S. at 237.  
 
5 The parties do not contest the part of the District Court’s order 
denying Caesar’s motion to suppress the bedsheets, 
pillowcases, underwear, and DNA sample.  Accordingly, that 




Exclusion is a “bitter pill,” id., swallowed only where it would 
result in a “substantial deterrent effect” that outweighs its 
resulting costs, Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6.   
The Leon good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
effectuates this balance by forbidding suppression where 
officers act in “good faith” or “objectively reasonable reliance” 
on a search warrant later held to be defective.  468 U.S. at 922; 
see also Katzin, 769 F.3d at 171.  Under these circumstances, 
where an officer acted illegally but did so “in the objectively 
reasonable belief that [his] conduct did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment,” it is unlikely the threat of suppression would 
deter any future constitutional violations.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 
918.  We do not exclude the fruits of unconstitutional searches 
in such cases because any marginal deterrent benefit is 
outweighed by its costs. 
Since Leon, the Supreme Court has further refined the 
good faith exception, placing the culpability of the officer’s 
misconduct at the center of the deterrence analysis.  See 
Herring, 555 U.S. at 143; Davis, 564 U.S. at 238.  It could be 
said that these more recent pronouncements in Herring and 
Davis have expanded the reach of the good faith exception and 
further narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rule.  See Davis, 
564 U.S. at 258–59 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  Since the deterrent 
effect of exclusion “varies with the culpability of the law 
enforcement conduct” at issue, the exclusionary rule applies 
only where the official conduct is “sufficiently deliberate that 
exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable 
that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice 
system.”  Herring, 555 U.S. at 143–44.  To trigger the 
exclusionary rule, law enforcement conduct must be 
“deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,” or involve 
“recurring or systemic negligence.”  Id. at 144.  “[S]imple, 
‘isolated’ negligence,” in turn, does not warrant suppression.  
Davis, 564 U.S. at 238.   
Thus, “[t]he test for whether the good faith exception 
applies is ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would 
have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s 
authorization.’” United States v. Loy, 191 F.3d 360, 367 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23).  Guided by 




circumstances, “consider[ing] not only any defects in the 
warrant but also the officer’s conduct in obtaining and 
executing the warrant and what the officer knew or should have 
known.”  United States v. Franz, 772 F.3d 134, 147 (3d Cir. 
2014).  In doing so, we bear in mind that police officers are not 
trained attorneys and generally cannot be expected to second-
guess a magistrate’s probable cause determination.  See 
Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012).  
Accordingly, “[t]he mere existence of a warrant typically 
suffices to prove that an officer conducted a search in good 
faith,” United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 307–08 (3d Cir. 
2001), and “will obviate the need for any deep inquiry into 
[the] reasonableness” of the officer’s reliance on the warrant, 
United States v. Stearn, 597 F.3d 540, 561 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
In “rare circumstances,” id., however, a warrant may be 
so flawed that “the officer will have no reasonable grounds for 
believing that [it] was properly issued,” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 
(footnote omitted).  We have identified four such situations in 
which the good faith exception does not apply: 
(1) where the magistrate judge issued the 
warrant in reliance on a deliberately or 
recklessly false affidavit; 
(2) where the magistrate judge abandoned his 
or her judicial role and failed to perform 
his or her neutral and detached function; 
(3) where the warrant was based on an 
affidavit so lacking in indicia of probable 
cause as to render official belief in its 
existence entirely unreasonable; or 
(4) where the warrant was so facially 
deficient that it failed to particularize the 
place to be searched or the things to be 
seized. 
United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 140, 151 (3d Cir. 2010); see 
also Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.  According to Caesar and the 
District Court, this case presents the third exception to the good 




Leon provided early guidance as to how the good faith 
exception can apply notwithstanding a warrant affidavit that 
lacks facts sufficient to establish probable cause.  There, police 
officers initiated an investigation based on a confidential 
informant’s tip that the defendants were selling drugs and later 
secured a facially valid warrant to search the defendants’ 
homes and automobiles.  Leon, 468 U.S. at 901–02.  The court 
of appeals suppressed the evidence seized because the warrant 
application contained no information regarding the informant’s 
reliability or the basis of his statements and accordingly failed 
to satisfy probable cause.  Id. at 905.  While declining to review 
the lower court’s probable cause determination, the Supreme 
Court noted that the affidavit nevertheless relayed the details 
of the officers’ “extensive investigation” and provided “much 
more than a ‘bare bones’ affidavit.”  Id. at 926.  And as 
demonstrated by the divided panel opinions of the lower court, 
the affidavit “provided evidence sufficient to create 
disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the 
existence of probable cause.”  Id.  Accordingly, the Court held 
that the officers’ reliance on the magistrate’s probable cause 
determination was objectively reasonable, and that suppression 
would not advance the remedial purposes of the exclusionary 
rule.  Id. 
Although we decline to rule on probable cause, “the 
probable cause inquiry remains highly relevant” to our good 
faith analysis.  Stearn, 597 F.3d at 562.  In determining whether 
the good faith exception should apply, we examine whether an 
officer could reasonably believe that probable cause existed by 
assessing the facts in light of the relevant legal standards and 
pronouncements in applicable precedent.  Under that 
precedent, probable cause is a “fluid concept,” turning on “the 
factual and practical considerations of everyday life,” which 
requires only a “fair probability that contraband or evidence of 
a crime will be found in a particular place.”  Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 231–32, 238 (1983).  As we explain below, the 
existence of probable cause here is a close question under our 
Fourth Amendment caselaw, but that does not preclude the 
determination that the officers acted in good faith. 
C. The Officers Seized the Images from Caesar’s 





The question before us is whether the facts set forth in 
the initial affidavit of probable cause were so deficient that the 
officers’ reliance on the accompanying warrant to search 
Caesar’s home and electronic devices was entirely 
unreasonable.6  Like the District Court, we are mindful of our 
opinions in Zimmerman and John.  Both those cases address 
the extent to which police officers can reasonably rely on 
warrants supported, in part, by police officers’ statements 
about the tendency of child sexual abusers to possess child 
pornography.  In both cases, divided panels concluded that the 
good faith exception did not apply.  However, Zimmerman and 
John are distinguishable on their facts, and they do not 
persuade us that the first affidavit was so obviously defective 
that no reasonable officer would have believed there was 
probable cause to search for child pornography and images of 
Caesar’s sexual abuse victims.  Moreover, given the Supreme 
Court opinions in Herring and Davis, both of which were 
controlling when the warrant was issued, we cannot conclude 
that the officers’ conduct in seizing and searching the devices 
was sufficiently flagrant to justify suppression of the images.   
1. 
Because the District Court’s reasoning relied almost 
entirely on our precedent in Zimmerman and John, we will 
discuss those opinions in some detail.   
In Zimmerman, the police secured a warrant to search 
the home of the defendant, a high school teacher and coach, for 
evidence of sexual abuse of minors, including adult 
pornography and child pornography.  277 F.3d at 429–30.  The 
affidavit of probable cause included three categories of 
information.  First, some of Zimmerman’s students alleged that 
he had sexually abused them at school and on athletics road 
trips.  Id. at 430–31.  Second, some current students and one 
former student stated that Zimmerman had shown them adult 
pornography at Zimmerman’s home six and ten months before 
the warrant application.  Id. at 430, 434.  Third, the affidavit 
related a postal inspector’s opinion that “persons with a sexual 
interest in children may possess child pornography and keep it 
in their homes for extended periods of time.”  Id. at 431.  
 




During the search of Zimmerman’s home, police seized several 
images of child pornography, among other items.  Id. 
We held that the affidavit failed to set forth probable 
cause to search for child pornography and that the good faith 
exception did not apply.  Id. at 429.  As to probable cause, we 
noted that the warrant application “contained no information 
that Zimmerman had ever purchased or possessed child 
pornography,” and that “there was absolutely no information 
in the affidavit . . . indicating that child pornography was—or 
ever had been located [in his home].”  Id. at 432–33.  Because 
the Government conceded that the police lacked probable 
cause, we declined to determine how much weight, if any, to 
attribute to the postal inspector’s statement about the 
molestation-child pornography connection.  Id. at 433 n.4.  We 
noted, however, that “there [was] nothing” in the postal 
inspector’s statement about Zimmerman, the facts of his case, 
or the results of the investigation.  Id. at 434.  And without 
additional factual support, such “[r]ambling boilerplate 
recitations [regarding a molestation-pornography link] . . . may 
have added fat to the affidavit, but certainly no muscle” in the 
probable cause calculus.  Id. at 433 n.4 (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).   
The good faith exception did not apply because the 
affidavit was “clearly insufficient” and “it was ‘entirely 
unreasonable’ for an official to believe to the contrary.”  Id. at 
437.  We reached that conclusion because—having already 
rejected the postal inspector’s statements—the only 
information linking pornography of any kind to Zimmerman’s 
residence was a single stale allegation that Zimmerman had 
stored a video of adult pornography on his home computer.  Id.   
Then-Judge Alito, who would later write the majority 
opinion for the Supreme Court in Davis, dissented.  He 
reasoned that, even if the warrant did not state “fresh probable 
cause” to search for child pornography, the majority 
improperly refused to apply the good faith exception.  Id. at 
438 (Alito, J., dissenting).  Pointing to Zimmerman’s 
“allegedly extended course of conduct with the students and 
his use of [adult] sexual materials in carrying out that course of 
conduct,” the dissent concluded that the affidavit provided 




materials” in his home at the time of the search.  Id. at 440.  
Unlike the majority, the dissent declined to opine whether the 
affidavit “provided fresh probable cause.”  Id.  But because 
“there is no bright line between fresh and stale probable cause,” 
the dissent concluded that this case did not present one of the 
“rare circumstances in which, although a neutral magistrate has 
found that there is probable cause, a lay officer executing the 
warrant could not reasonably believe that the magistrate was 
correct.”  Id.  
Unlike Zimmerman, John involved a warrant 
application that lacked any express statement about the link 
between molestation and pornography but nonetheless relied 
on an unsupported inference that child abusers often collect 
child pornography.  There, the officer applied for a warrant to 
search the home of John, a teacher, after some of his sixth-
grade students reported that he had sexually assaulted them in 
his classroom.  John, 654 F.3d at 414.  The students claimed 
that John maintained two notebooks where he kept 
“inappropriate” notes about his female students, which he 
brought to and from school each day.  Id.  The warrant sought 
permission to collect the notebooks and child pornography.  Id. 
We held that the affidavit was “wholly lacking in 
probable cause[] because [e]ven a cursory reading of [the] 
affidavit reveals that there is not a single assertion that John 
was in any way associated with child pornography.”  Id. at 419 
(second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The allegations that John had committed sex crimes 
on school property and that “he kept two particular pieces of 
evidence of those crimes in his home” were inadequate “to 
establish—or even to hint at—probable cause as to the wholly 
separate crime of possessing child pornography.”  Id.  
Accordingly, the affidavit needed to allege the existence of an 
“assault-pornography correlation” explicitly and state the basis 
for the allegation.  Id.  Such a statement might be supported by 
“studies . . . show[ing] that a correlation exists between one 
crime and the other,” or “perhaps extensive investigatory 
experience.”  Id. at 420.  But because the affidavit did not 
include either, we would not permit the officer to infer a 
connection between two distinct crimes to support a showing 




Judge Fuentes dissented.  Underscoring the Supreme 
Court’s then-recent opinions in Herring and Davis, he 
concluded that the officer’s conduct was not sufficiently 
culpable to warrant the suppression remedy.  Id. at 423 
(Fuentes, J., dissenting).  He reasoned that, given the shortage 
of circuit court opinions addressing analogous fact patterns at 
the time of the search, a reasonably well-trained police officer 
would have acted just as the officer did: “[S]he would submit 
a request to a judge asking whether there is probable cause for 
a warrant.  And, lacking legal training herself, she would then 
rely on that judicial determination to do her job.”  Id. at 425.  
The dissent observed that even subsequent court of appeals 
opinions addressing the question presented—whether probable 
cause to believe someone has molested a child “automatically” 
supplies probable cause to believe that person possesses child 
pornography—“provide[d] conflicting guidance.”  Id. 
(citing United States v. Hodson, 543 F.3d 286, 292–93 (6th Cir. 
2008); United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 122, 125 (2d Cir. 
2008); and United States v. Colbert, 605 F.3d 573, 578–79 (8th 
Cir. 2010)).  And if “even judges, steeped in law and acting in 
the utmost good faith, can have different opinions on the issue 
. . . it was not objectively unreasonable—let alone, entirely 
unreasonable—for [the officer] to take one side of the 
controversy over the other, even if we now disagree with that 
decision.”  Id.  According to the dissent, suppression would not 
adequately deter officers from making such a mistake, and the 
good faith exception should therefore apply.  Id. 
2. 
With these precedents in mind, we turn to the facts of 
this case.  Here, the District Court faulted Gallina’s initial 
warrant application for many of the same deficiencies of the 
Zimmerman and John warrants, even concluding that, as in 
those cases, “nothing in the first affidavit hinted that Caesar 
ever had child pornography or images of the victims in his 
home.”  Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *16.  The 
court further held that the only “conceivable bases” for 
probable cause to search for child pornography “were the 
‘unexamined biases and stereotypes’ Gallina briefly mentioned 
in the affidavit.”  Id. at *20 (quoting John, 654 F.3d at 421).  




Setting aside Gallina’s statements about the link 
between molestation and pornography for now, we conclude 
that the initial affidavit provided more than the “bare bones” or 
“paltry” affidavits that preclude good faith reliance.  United 
States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 664 (3d Cir. 2012); 
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 438.  As in Leon, the affidavit detailed 
the origin of Gallina’s investigation and the multiple steps 
officers took leading to the issuance of the initial warrant: the 
receipt of the NCMEC tip, review of the eBay messages and 
associated IP address, verification of Caesar’s driver’s license 
records, and four interviews with Caesar’s landlord, the 
victims, and victims’ mother.  See 468 U.S. at 901.  By relying 
on interviews that were conducted only days before the search, 
the affidavit supplied more than a solitary piece of stale 
evidence.  See Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 437.  Moreover, the 
affidavit was not merely based upon a single uncorroborated 
anonymous tip, see United States v. Williams, 3 F.3d 69, 73–
74 (3d Cir. 1993), or an officer’s conclusory statement that he 
believed probable cause existed, see Pavulak, 700 F.3d at 664.  
Indeed, the existence of probable cause to search for 
sexually explicit images presents a closer question here than in 
Zimmerman and John, where we concluded with little trouble 
that probable cause was absent.  The initial affidavit stated a 
stronger basis than the warrant applications in both those 
cases—namely because it included detailed allegations that 
Caesar sexually abused the two brothers not in school, but in 
his home for over two years, and because Caesar used eBay to 
seek out images of children in various stages of undress.  
Taking these facts together, the affidavit contained some basis 
for believing Caesar had sexually explicit images of children 
in his house.  The third exception to the good faith exception, 
for affidavits “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to 
render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable,” is 
therefore of questionable applicability.  Tracey, 597 F.3d at 
151. 
The District Court’s primary criticism of the affidavit 
was that it failed to formally accuse Caesar of violating 
Pennsylvania’s child pornography statute7 and identified no 
 
7 See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6312(c), (d), (g) (prohibiting the 




direct evidence that Caesar took photos of his victims or kept 
child pornography in his home—the two categories of images 
identified in the warrant application.  But therein lies the rub.  
“[D]irect evidence linking the place to be searched to the crime 
is not required” to establish probable cause.  Hodge, 246 F.3d 
at 305 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Rather, probable cause to search for an item “can be, 
and often is, inferred by ‘considering the type of crime, the 
nature of the items sought, the suspect’s opportunity for 
concealment and normal inferences about where a criminal 
might hide’” the fruits of his crime.  United States v. Jones, 994 
F.2d 1051, 1056 (3d Cir. 1993) (citation omitted); see also 
United States v. Price, 558 F.3d 270, 282 (3d Cir. 2009).  
Whether or not they were enough to satisfy probable cause, the 
allegations about Caesar’s prolonged sexual abuse of the two 
brothers and his interest in photos of children in various stages 
of undress supported the reasonableness of the officers’ belief 
that probable cause existed. 
First, Gallina’s affidavit set forth a connection between 
Caesar’s sexual interest in children and the site of the search 
where the electronic equipment was located.  In Zimmerman 
and John, nearly all the alleged sexual abuse occurred at the 
schools where the defendants worked.  In contrast, the alleged 
sexual abuse here occurred exclusively in the defendant’s 
home, in his bedroom, several times over two years, ending 
only weeks before the search.  As the District Court noted, the 
affidavit did not claim that Caesar photographed the brothers 
or used child pornography in aid of his sexual abuse.  The 
brothers’ allegations could nevertheless lead a reasonable 
officer to believe there was a critical link between the 
defendant’s pursuit of sexual gratification via children and 
possession of equipment containing explicit images of children 
in his home.  That link was certainly closer than in Zimmerman 
and John. 
The strong allegations tying child molestation to 
Caesar’s home are particularly significant as they relate to the 
search for images of Caesar’s victims.  As described in the 
warrant application, such images would have constituted 
evidence of the allegations of child molestation.  Significantly, 
Caesar concedes on appeal that the affidavit set forth probable 




home.  While not necessarily sufficient to establish probable 
cause, the facts supporting that search would tend to support a 
further search, in the same location, for related evidence of the 
same crime—including photographs of the crime victims.  The 
fact that Caesar allegedly abused the brothers in his home and 
kept their used underwear also provided a basis for believing 
that he would have kept other mementos of the boys in his 
house.   
Second, and arguably more importantly, the affidavit 
recounted Caesar’s interest in images of partially dressed 
minors and the steps he took to secure such images.  Gallina 
averred that Caesar, a single man with no children, bid on used 
children’s underwear and swimwear and, in at least two 
instances, requested videos or photos of children modeling the 
posted clothing items.  The District Court summarily dismissed 
these communications and any images Caesar might have 
received8 as stale because they were at least six months old as 
of the search in January 2018.  Again, we are not so sure.  
Although the “[a]ge of the information supporting a warrant 
application is a factor in determining probable cause . . . , [a]ge 
alone . . . does not determine staleness.”  United States v. 
Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1322 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  
Rather than simply count the “months between the facts relied 
on and the issuance of the warrant,” id. (citation omitted), we 
must also consider “a number of variables, such as the nature 
of the crime, of the criminal, of the thing to be seized, and of 
the place to be searched,” United States v. Williams, 124 F.3d 
411, 420 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Tehfe, 722 
F.2d 1114, 1119 (3d Cir. 1998)).  
Gallina could reasonably have downplayed the six-
month gap in time between the NCMEC tip and warrant 
application because “pedophiles rarely, if ever, dispose of child 
pornography.”  Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 434.  Such evidence 
is therefore less likely to grow stale.  See United States v. 
Vosburgh, 602 F.3d 512, 529 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[I]nformation 
 
8 Although the District Court referred to the “eBay images,” 
we note that the initial affidavit failed to clearly state whether 
Caesar received any images from other eBay users in response 
to his solicitations.  See Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 




concerning [child pornography] crimes has a relatively long 
shelf life.”); United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 279 n.7 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (nine-month-old evidence that defendant 
participated in online groups sharing child pornography was 
not stale).  While Gallina did not specifically allege that 
Caesar’s eBay messages contained child pornography, the 
child-focused sexual nature of the messages was obvious based 
on the other information in the affidavit.  In one of its most 
graphic portions, the affidavit stated that after receiving a 
message from Caesar soliciting children’s undergarments, 
another eBay user replied, “If you buy it I will lube it and cum 
into [it] for you in skype real show and you can watch this.”  
App. 49.  Clearly, the NCMEC, Gallina, and magistrate judge 
were not alone in detecting Caesar’s infatuation with children 
and the sexual intentions behind his eBay messages.  The role 
these communications played in Caesar’s sexual pursuits could 
reasonably suggest that he would not quickly discard them. 
That Caesar sought out the images of partially dressed 
children by using a computer further counsels that the 
messages might not have been stale at the time of the officers’ 
search.  We have observed that images and files stored on 
computers are “not the type of evidence that rapidly dissipates 
or degrades.”  Vosburgh, 602 F.3d at 529.  Electronic files can 
remain indefinitely on computer devices, and digital forensic 
investigators often recover such evidence long after it is 
deleted.  Id.; see also United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 
1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (noting the “long memory of 
computers”).  It is therefore, at minimum, a close question 
whether this evidence was stale at the time of the search.  See 
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 440 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is 
no bright line between fresh and stale probable cause.”).   
We view these averments as something more than the 
“nothing” that the District Court concluded.  Caesar, 2019 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *16.  Instead, Caesar’s eBay activity, 
taken together with the detailed allegations of ongoing and 
contemporaneous sexual abuse in his house, could indicate his 
interest in pursuing visual sexual stimulation online.  It was not 
entirely unreasonable to believe that Caesar, an individual who 
had sought to obtain photos of partially dressed children, 
would likely possess such photos—or perhaps more explicit 




interests with the two brothers.  Evaluating these facts in 
totality, as required, we disagree with the District Court’s 
assessment.  See D.C. v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 588 (2018) 
(“Our precedents recognize that the whole is often greater than 
the sum of its parts—especially when the parts are viewed in 
isolation.”).   
The District Court was also critical of Gallina’s 
statements, from his purported experience, about the link 
between molestation and possession of child pornography.  In 
both John and Zimmerman we expressed skepticism about the 
existence of an “intuitive relationship” between child sexual 
abuse and child pornography.  John, 654 F.3d at 422; 
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 433 n.4.  Even in his dissent in John, 
Judge Fuentes acknowledged that the evidence of a correlation 
between the two offenses is “mixed.”  John, 654 F.3d at 423 
n.2 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).  But in assessing whether Gallina 
acted in good faith, we cannot ignore the volume of social 
science research and legal authority discussing the tendency of 
child sexual abusers to possess child pornography.  The 
legislature has also weighed in on this question.  In support of 
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Congress 
issued findings that “child pornography is often used by 
pedophiles and child sexual abusers to stimulate and whet their 
own sexual appetites, and as a model for sexual acting out with 
children.”  Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 121, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); 
see also S. Rep. No. 104-358, at 12–13 (1996) (“Law 
enforcement investigations have verified that pedophiles 
almost always collect child pornography or child erotica.”).  
More recently, the United States Sentencing Commission has 
commented on the frequency of “criminal sexually dangerous 
behavior”9 among child pornography offenders.  U.S. Sent’g 
Comm’n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses 169 (2012) 
(“Sentencing Commission Report”).  According to the 
Commission, social scientists have reached “varying 
conclusions” on this issue, but a consensus has identified 
“some correlation between viewing child pornography and sex 
 
9 As defined in the Sentencing Commission Report, “criminal 
sexually dangerous behavior” consists of “contact” sex 
offenses, “non-contact” sex offenses, and certain prior non-





offending.”  Id. at 102, 169; see also id. at 171–74 (canvassing 
the scholarship). 
Several of our sister circuits have favorably cited these 
findings in other contexts,10 and some have even called the 
molestation-pornography nexus “common sense,” United 
States v. Byrd, 31 F.3d 1329, 1339 (5th Cir. 1994), or 
“intuitive,” Colbert, 605 F.3d at 578.  Guided by our opinion 
in John, we do not go that far.  We nevertheless credit the 
weight of these authorities in concluding it was not entirely 
unreasonable for an officer to believe the initial affidavit set 
forth probable cause to search for the images. 
As we explained in John, the existence of a molestation-
pornography correlation is a factual question.  And in John we 
noted that officers who rely on this correlation must offer a 
factual basis for the magistrate judge to evaluate 
independently.  See 654 F.3d at 419–20.  Gallina did just that, 
or attempted to do so.  He explicitly relied on his experience 
and training to conclude that child sexual abusers tend to 
possess child pornography.  The District Court rejected these 
statements about the molestation-pornography connection as 
insufficient “boilerplate” that was not “tailor[ed]” to the facts 
of this case.  Caesar, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 206763, at *18.  
But Gallina clearly attempted to support his belief in the 
molestation-pornography nexus by reciting his lengthy 
experience conducting criminal investigations and the 
 
10 See United States v. Lebovitz, 401 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 
2005) (citing Congress’s factual findings in affirming the 
defendant’s sentence under the Sentencing Guidelines); United 
States v. Brand, 467 F.3d 179, 198 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing 
congressional findings in holding that evidence of child 
pornography was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(b), in part because “child pornography shares a strong 
nexus with pedophilia”); see also Byrd, 31 F.3d at 1339 
(rejecting defendant’s entrapment argument because “common 
sense would indicate that a person who is sexually interested 
in children is likely to also be inclined, i.e., predisposed, to 
order and receive child pornography”); Colbert, 605 F.3d at 
578 (“Child pornography is in many cases simply an electronic 




extensive list11 of investigative training courses he had 
completed.  By providing this exhaustive summary, Gallina at 
the very least tried to comply with John’s requirements, further 
supporting our conclusion that he searched for the images in 
good faith.   
 Even if it was questionable whether there existed 
probable cause to search for the images, Gallina’s reliance on 
the initial warrant and his conduct securing the warrant did not 
approach the standard of gross negligence required to trigger 
the exclusionary rule.  See Franz, 772 F.3d at 147.  We have 
described gross negligence generally “as the want of even scant 
care and the failure to exercise even that care which a careless 
person would use.”  United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 635, 640 
(3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for 
Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 462 (3d Cir.1990)). 
 
11 The full list of courses included the following: Criminal 
Behavior Assessment; Basic Narcotics Investigator; 
Identifying Deceptive Behavior; First Contact (“detailing 
behaviors and tendencies of suspects during interdictions of a 
traffic stop”); Current Drug Trends; Commercial Vehicle 
Interdiction; Passenger Vehicle Interdiction; Conducting 
Complete Traffic Stops; Operation Safe Highways Initiative 
for Effective Law Enforcement Detection; Background 
Investigator; Wiretap ‘A’ Certification; Cell Phone Use in 
Drug Investigations; Interview and Interrogation; Statement 
Analysis (“detailing techniques and methods at identifying and 
analyzing truthful and deceptive written and verbal 
statements”); Ritual Homicide Investigation; and Violent 
Crime Behavioral Analysis (“utilizing behavioral analysis in 
identifying, analyzing, and investigating homicides, child 
abductions, and kidnappings”).  App. 48. 
While Gallina lacked experience investigating sex 
offenses such as the ones in this case, the summary of his 
background analyzing criminal behavior in other contexts and 
his generally applicable training satisfied John’s basic 
requirements.  Coupled with his obvious familiarity and 
personal connection with the facts of this case, contra 
Zimmerman, 277 F.3d at 433 n.4, Gallina’s statements linking 
child molestation to child pornography were adequately 




Based on the record, we cannot say that Gallina acted 
without “even scant care” in the execution of the first warrant.  
Id.  As required, he submitted a warrant application that set 
forth several facts tending to show that child pornography and 
images of sexual abuse victims might be found in Caesar’s 
house.  “[T]hose facts presented the magistrate with the 
judgmental task of evaluating their cumulative significance 
and testing it against the legal standard of probable cause.”  
Williams, 3 F.3d at 74.  Where, as here, probable cause presents 
a close judgment call, we conclude that suppression would not 
meaningfully deter future Fourth Amendment violations.  
Once the magistrate judge makes the call in such cases, officers 
are entitled to rely on it and execute the authorized search 
without sanction.12   
3. 
Caesar urges that the images must nonetheless be 
suppressed because they were recovered from his electronic 
devices only after execution of the third warrant.  As discussed 
above, that warrant’s affidavit of probable cause was based in 
 
12 Caesar argues that reversing the District Court would 
“open[] the door to assume that every person accused of child 
molestation is automatically under investigation for child 
pornography.”  Appellee’s Br. 31.  These concerns are 
misplaced.  Our good faith determination does not disturb a key 
principle of our holdings in Zimmerman and John: that 
probable cause to believe a defendant engaged in child 
molestation, alone, cannot establish probable cause to search 
for evidence of the separate crime of possessing child 
pornography.  See Falso, 544 F.3d at 122, 128 (holding that the 
affidavit failed to state probable cause because it relied on a 
“fallacious inference” linking child sexual abuse to child 
pornography, but applying the good faith exception because 
“[probable cause] is certainly an issue upon which reasonable 
minds can differ”); cf. United States v. Edwards, 813 F.3d 953, 
966, 972 (10th Cir. 2015) (concluding that probable cause was 
lacking because the affidavit relied on a “logically fallacious” 
link between possession of child pornography and other 
“pedophilic tendencies,” but applying the good faith exception 
because the link “[was] not so obviously unsound that it 




part on a summary of the items seized in the search of Caesar’s 
home and Caesar’s post-invocation admissions that he viewed 
child pornography on some of the electronic devices.  Caesar 
argues that the third warrant was therefore tainted by the 
unlawful seizure of the devices and illegally obtained 
confession and that it failed to independently supply probable 
cause to search the devices themselves.  This argument ignores 
the fact that the initial warrant expressly permitted a search for 
the digital images themselves.  See App. 47 (authorizing a 
search for the specified images “in any form . . . [including 
those] stored on personal electronic devices” (emphasis 
added)); see also United States v. Gregoire, 638 F.3d 962, 
967–68 (8th Cir. 2011) (“A search warrant which specifically 
authorized the seizure of a computer and a search for financial 
records clearly contemplates at least a limited search of the 
computer’s contents without the need of a second warrant.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Even if a warrant lacks such express authorization, 
courts have routinely upheld subsequent searches of legally 
seized electronic equipment.  Multiple circuit courts have 
recognized that “a second warrant to search a properly seized 
computer is not necessary where the evidence obtained in the 
search did not exceed the probable cause articulated in the 
original warrant.”  United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 652 
(6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
United States v. Upham, 168 F.3d 532, 536 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(“The extraction of unlawful images from within the computer 
and diskettes was . . . contemplated by the warrant” where 
“[t]he warrant explicitly authorized the seizure of both the 
computer plus diskettes and the unlawful images” and “[t]he 
images . . . were ‘inside’ the computer or diskettes.”).13 
Accordingly, we do not believe a distinction between the 
devices and images is warranted for purposes of our good faith 
inquiry.  Because the initial warrant permitted both the seizure 
and search of the electronic devices and supported the officers’ 
 
13 Those holdings accord with Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 41, which provides that, unless otherwise specified, 
a warrant authorizing the seizure of electronic storage media 
also “authorizes a later review of the media or information 




good faith reliance, the third warrant was unnecessary to 
review the contents of the devices.   
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize Gallina’s 
egregious conduct during his interrogation of Caesar.  Caesar 
invoked his right to remain silent at least six times, but Gallina 
continued to question him about the sexual abuse allegations 
and electronic devices seized during the search of his home.  
Caesar urges that this misconduct reflects Gallina’s “overly 
aggressive and illegal” approach to the investigation as a whole 
and that such conduct was sufficiently culpable to warrant 
suppression of the images.  Appellee’s Br. 43.  But Gallina’s 
misconduct following the seizure of the devices does not alter 
our conclusion that he and the other officers relied on the initial 
warrant in good faith.  Cf. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 
463, 475 (1980) (“The exclusionary rule enjoins the 
Government from benefiting from evidence it has unlawfully 
obtained; it does not reach backward to taint information that 
was in official hands prior to any illegality.”).  Once the 
officers seized the devices, they were also entitled to search the 
devices, as explicitly authorized by the magistrate judge.14   
 
14 Because we conclude that the third warrant was superfluous, 
we need not decide whether Caesar’s ill-gotten confession or 
any of the evidence seized under the first warrant might have 
tainted the third warrant such that it could not support an 
officer’s good faith reliance.  That question—whether the good 
faith exception may apply to a warrant issued on the basis of 
evidence derived from an earlier constitutional violation—is 
not one that we have squarely addressed.  We note, however, 
that several of our sister circuits have held that the good faith 
exception may, under certain circumstances, overcome the 
taint of earlier unconstitutional conduct.  See United States v. 
Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 525–28 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 564–566 (6th Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Fletcher, 91 F.3d 48, 51–52 (8th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1368 (2d Cir. 1985).  But see 
United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239–40 (11th Cir. 
2005) (holding that the good faith exception did not apply 
where the officer presented tainted evidence in support of a 
warrant application); United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 




We will not punish the Government because Gallina 
took the extra step of securing an unnecessary warrant but then 
committed serious errors in doing so.  Given our conclusion 
that an officer could rely on the first warrant in good faith, 
suppressing the images based on the third warrant’s flaws 
would put the Government in a worse position than if the 
officers had simply searched the devices immediately upon 
seizing them.  Cf. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443–44 (1984) 
(holding that the benefits and costs of the exclusionary rule 
“are properly balanced by putting the police in the same, not a 
worse, position that they would have been in if no police error 
or misconduct had occurred”).  Excluding the images under 
these circumstances would not meaningfully deter future 
Fourth Amendment violations.  On the contrary, suppression 
might discourage police officers from seeking judicial 
authorization for follow-up searches in cases where, unlike 
here, an additional warrant is actually needed.  We therefore 
conclude that the images should not be suppressed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse that part of 
the District Court’s order suppressing the images of child 
pornography and images of sexual abuse victims seized from 
Caesar’s electronic devices.  The District Court’s order will be 
affirmed in all other respects.  The case will be remanded to 
the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
